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As part of our special issue appreciating the work of Ulrich Beck, this article introduces and 
rearticulates his concept of individualization for an audience beyond those engaged with 
sociological theory. It is argued to be WKHµIRUJRWWHQKDOI¶RI%HFN¶VDSSURDFK that is in 
particular need of both restatement and reaffirmation of its contemporary relevance. It does 
so by firstly contextualizing and explaining its comparatively limited impact before 
elaborating the stages of the individualizing process and how his key notion of 
µGLVHPEHGGLQJZLWKRXWUH-HPEHGGLQJ¶LVGLVWLQFWIURPWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the individualizing dynamic within modernity. Its relevance and utility is then indicated 
through surveying developments in family and affective relations in China and America, two 
RI%HFN¶VLGHDOW\SHVRILQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQSattern. Both demonstrate a pattern of radical 
µGLVHPEHGGLQJ¶, and DFRQVFLRXVDQGSDUWLDOµUH-HPEHGGLQJ¶LQWKHFDVHRIWKH µQHR-
WUDGLWLRQDO¶American middle class family. Following this, the article suggests a stronger 
potential connection between the risk and individualization dimensions of his approach than 
was drawn out by Beck himself, through focusing upon the uncertainty created by 
disembedding. The uncertainty that follows from individualization suggests precautionary 
retreat into security and the construction of risk as a means of embodying and managing 
uncertainty. Recognition of this social dynamic is potentially more useful in understanding 






%HFN¶Vµ2WKHUHalf¶of the Second Modernity 
The social theorist Scott Lash (2010, vii) notes in his foreword to the key work on 
individualization by Ulrich Beck and his wife Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim that despite the 
much greater impact made by his environmental/risk thesis it is, µWKHRWKHUKDOIDQGPD\EHWKH
PRVWLPSRUWDQWKDOI¶ of his ideas. Individualization can be regarded as the µPRVWLPSRUWDQW¶in 
the sense that it is empirically grounded, consistently argued and without the contradiction 
and confusing switching between different levels of analysis evident in different expositions 
of the risk thesis. There, we remain XQVXUHZKHWKHUWKHµULVNVRFLHW\¶LVDFKDQJHof 
perception or reality, or what any balance between the two might be, for example. More 
basically, Beck is more knowledgeable and informed on the territory of individualization, 
familiar with the historical development of social and legal relations central to the 
individualisation process, in contrast to the factual weakness of key elements of the risk 
thesis such as the qualitatively new threat he wrongly argues is posed by radiation (Burgess 
2006), or the argument that risks are now uninsurable as further confirmation of the novelty 
RIWKHµULVNVRFLHW\¶. :KLOVW%HFNZDVULJKWWRVXJJHVWDµORVVRIVLJQLILFDQFH¶ZLWKUHJDUGWR
commercial insurance of some large-scale environmental risks, even the hazards most 
difficult to insure ± earthquake threat in Japan and the prospect of a repeat of the 9/11 attack 
in the United States ± have not proven uninsurable as the state has stepped in to become an 
insurer of last resort (Borscheid and Haueter 2012, 33). 
 
Despite an arguably firmer foundation, the individualization thesis remains the neglected 
cousin of environmental risk LQWHUPVRIWKHLPSDFWPDGHE\%HFN¶VLGHDV. Remarkably few 
have directly explored it beyond the work of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (Howard 2007; 
Dawson 2012), and in the related writings of Antony Giddens (1991) and Zygmunt Bauman 
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(2000). In the UK, it was more likely to be refuted rather than explored, with the debates it 
stimulated mainly in his native Germany (Berger and Hitzler 2010; Burzan 2011), and some 
further empirical exploration in the Nordic nations (Hansen and Svarverud 2010). Why was 
this? Partly because in comparative terms the risk dimension was brought into sharp relief 
globally by events - most notably the Chernobyl nuclear accident - whilst individualization 
concerned more hidden, underlying processes of social change. Actually, a different 
momentous event informed the impact of the individualization thesis also, but was more 
confined to %HFN¶Vnative Germany in rethinking social theory. At the start of their key 
volume on individualization, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002:1) focus attention on the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989. This radical break with the past brought both the promise of 
freedom but also market-driven uncertainty in its wake; a key motif of the thesis as a whole. 
In this context it was perhaps easier for German intellectuals to engage with the suggestion of 
a qualitative rupture with a collectivist past, rather than emphasizing how countervailing 
pressures to individualization such as class remained dominant, as was the predominant 
perspective in the UK (Atkinson 2007), a nation where the modern state has never collapsed 
or been conquered, and class-based political parties have remained both hegemonic and 
continuous since the early twentieth century.  
 
A further factor in its relatively limited impact is that the particular form and language of 
individualization did not engage or resonate internationally in such a form, even if the 
process itself was recognised in some countries, particularly the United States. There - but in 
simpler and more evocative terms ± sociologist Robert Putnam made a significant impact 
even beyond academia with his book, Bowling Alone (2001), which described how 
Americans used to spend their leisure time in collective pursuits such as bowling clubs but 
this is now more likely to be a solitary pastime. The context for this impact was the theme of 
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individualism being long established as an historical marker of American distinctiveness, 
famously identified already in the nineteenth century by de Tocqueville (1998, first ed. 1835), 
and that became entrenched and counter posed to European collectivism and welfarism. 
Alongside this, America has a self-conscious tradition of civic association that it holds dear 
and could be held up as under threat in 3XWQDP¶Vwork by the individualization process.  
 
Outside of the United States, however, contemporary individualization has remained a 
marginal intellectual strand, understood more as an unfortunate consequence of destructive 
economic forces than an object of study in its own right,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHµQHROLEHUDOLVP¶
of the 1980s and 1990s individualism tended to be viewed in its caricatured form of 
acquisitive enrichment and disdain for welfarism, and attention focused on the top-down 
dynamic of µneo-liberalism¶ rather than the bottom-up process of individualization. In this 
environment, critiques of Beck objecting to his downplaying of class were better received - 
even though they arguably diGQ¶WDGYDQFHPXFKEH\RQGWKHproposition that class and access 
to resources remain important (Atkinson 2007). Such a focus resonated better within social 
sciences and its key working categories than the bold suggestion that individualization and 
risk now stood alongside class, race, nation and gender in their importance. This takes us to 
locating the limited impact of individualization SUHFLVHO\LQWKHSUREOHPWKDW%HFN¶VHQWLUH
oeuvre railed against, and to the style that the individualization thesis shared with his work as 
a whole. 
 
WKDWLVVRRIWHQQRWUHFRJQLVHGDERXW%HFN¶s work and its style is the challenging, 
provocative intent behind his writing that was to some extent as important as the content 
itself. %HFN¶VSULQFLSDOIUXVWUDWLRQDQGREMHFWLYHZDVWRZDNHLQWHOOHFWXDOOLIHXS to how much 
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the post-1960s world had changed; that the underlying social realities were as dramatically 
transformed as more visible manifestations like the collapse of communism. He implored that 
the tools, concepts and frameworks ± most obviously the still primarily national perspective 
of intellectual thought that he attacked most frequently ± were inadequate for understanding 
this changed world. He vigorously contested the assumption of closed national systems of 
predominant functionalist perspectives and their focus upon balance and interconnection 
rather than change. The view of societies as relatively timeless functional systems left social 
WKHRU\LOOHTXLSSHGWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHJOREDOIRUFHVRIµUHIOH[LYHPRGHUQL]DWLRQ¶DQG
individualization. Perhaps frustratingly, his focus upon challenging prevailing academic 




Beck was keen to emphasize what had changed within post-1960s Western societies over and 
above the more usual sociological focus upon what remained more similar, as he challenged 
what he saw as a stubborn attachment to old modes of thinking. His view was that post 1960s 
Western societies had become fundamentally distinct from the classical modernity of 
capitalist industrialization, driven by the breakdown of collective norms and hierarchies and 
the liberation of women. He thought we have reached a point of transformation from only 
quantitative changeWHOOLQJXVWKDWµ,QGLVHPEHGGHGLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQLQGLYLGXDODFWLRQ
becomes qualitatively more important. It is one of those moments in history where difference 
becomes difference iQNLQG¶%HFNDQG:LOOLDPV2004, 63). He uses the useful Marxist term 
µKLVWRULFDOO\VSHFLILF¶WRHPSKDVL]H how even what apparently remains similar such as 
residual gender inequality has to be understood as having different meaning and implication 
LQFKDQJHGµVSHFLILF¶FRQWH[WV (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, 51). Whilst there remains 
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some similarity of form between social relations in the pre and post 1960, the content and 
even the characterisation is radically diffHUHQWLQWKHQHZµVHFRQG¶RUµUHIOH[LYH¶PRGHUQLW\ 
 
An important H[DPSOH%HFNGUHZXSRQLVPDUULDJHZKLFKLQKLVZRUGVZDVRQFHµ«ILUVWDQG
foremost an institution raised above the individual today it is more and more becoming a 
product and construct of the individuals forming it¶%HFNDQG%HFN-Gernsheim 2002, 9). 
People are still marrying, often in a more idealised fashion than ever before, as it has become 
a lifestyle option laden with conditional expectations of individual fulfilment. But a similar 
form and act of marriage now has a fundamentally different social meaning, from an 
REOLJDWRU\FRPPLWPHQWWRµORYHKRQRXUDQGREH\¶RUJDQLVHGE\ZLGHUIDPLO\, WRDµVSHFLDO
GD\¶ZKHUHWZRLQGLYLGXDOVGHFLGHWRSXEOLFO\FRPPLWWKHPVHOYHVWRHDFKRWKHURQDQHTXDO
basis - generally shorn of meaningful religious blessing and in the knowledge that union can 
be relatively easily dissolved. Whilst marriage and civil partnership remain the most 
numerically predominant, the UK reflects broader international trends in how it is 
FRKDELWDWLRQDQGVROROLYLQJWKDWDUHWKHIDVWHVWJURZLQJµIDPLO\¶IRUPwhere ritualised union 
and even settled partnership have been dispensed with altogether (Klinenberg 2012; ONS 
2015). Reflecting the kind of privileging of continuity over change that frustrated Beck, 
academic sociology of family continues to emphasize that the modern family continues to 
evolve and diversify in the sense that it always has done, without fundamentally questioning 
its very nature (Chambers 2012). Yet, as well as increasingly common solo living and 
cohabitation, WKHUHLVHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWDQHZQRUPRIµIUDJLOHIDPLOLHV¶WKDWQRZVFDUFHO\
function in any traditional sense, affirming the emphasis upon qualitative rather than only 




Because his primary purpose was to disrupt existing frameworks of social and political 
thought and refocus energy, %HFN¶V work is necessarily one-sided and not as concerned as is 
intellectually usual with ensuring consistency or even veracity. Knowledge is contextual and 
the context he faced - and arguably we continue to confront - is of a reluctance to 
DFNQRZOHGJHWKHH[WHQWRIFKDQJHLQWKHµVHFRQGPRGHUQLW\¶ It is intellectually easier to 
identify continuity historically and point to historical precedents that suggest that little in 
society is really new, and this is arguably the sociological default position. On this basis, we 
can understand %HFN¶VRWKHUZLVHFXULRXVand polemical orientation. We can also understand 
in this context why he never really integrated the different dimensions of his theory, being 
fundamentally concerned with an indirect critique of existing approaches, drawing upon 
whatever best suited the advancement of his case. Rather than provide an overall theory of 
risk he was more concerned with contesting what he saw as the superficiality and ahistorical 
character of existing approaches. 7KLVLVQ¶WWRVD\VXFKRQH-sidedness was always successful 
DQGGLGQ¶Wlend itself to caricature. Associated ideas such as his collaborator $QWRQ\*LGGHQV¶
(1992) µSXUHORYH¶XQQHFHVVDULO\ZHQWWRRIDULQasserting that contemporary sexual union 
now exclusively concerns mutual affection, and was an easy target on this basis (e.g. 




Individualization GRHVQ¶WRQO\PHDQ± but does involve ± more self-orientation and a 
corresponding decline in community and traditional family obligation, as we will see with the 
examples of contemporary China and the United States, below. Nor is there the simple 
suggestion that aggressive narcissism has become a norm, even though we can discern such 
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trends in a Facebook-driven culture of EHLQJµDORQHWRJHWKHU¶, and self-promotion through 
envy (Turkle 2011). Equally, Beck is not centrally concerned with a self-actualizing 
individualism of personal discovery, though this too is one dimension of the contemporary 
µWKHUDSHXWLFVWDWH¶ (Nolan 1998). The thesis concerns what Beck saw as the distinctive pattern 
and intensification of individualizing trends within post-196VµVHFRQGPRGHUQLW\¶LQWKH
developed industrialized societies of the West. New structural & institutional pressures 
determine greater concern with individual skills and opportunities, pulling away from ties to 
collective institutions. A competitive, flexible job market requires continually improved 
performance, and hence retraining, and similar pressures drive young people to perform in a 
highly individuated fashion in the µknowledge economy¶. New rights and obligations are 
routinely not addressed to collectivities like community, but instead to the individual. Identity 
can then be transformed from a given prescribed role into a task, charging each individual 
with responsibility for performance and the consequences. The process is an open-ended one 
without the boundaries or clear GHPDUFDWLRQWKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HGWKHSUHVFULEHGUROHVDQGµMRE
IRUOLIH¶RIWKHSRVWZDUERRP  
 
The greater choice available to the contemporary individual compared to previous 
JHQHUDWLRQVLVSHUKDSV%HFN¶VPRVWUHSHDWHGsingle term and starting point. The falling away 
of social barriers to greater choice can be thought of as the trigger for what follows, as in the 
H[DPSOHRIFRPPXQLVP¶VFROODSVH mentioned above. Most important is the extraordinary 
transformation of the position of women in Western societies, creating choice approaching 
equality and reconfiguring the nature of family life. Change is not confined to the role of 
women, however, as the role and nature of µfatherhood¶ has also been transformed from 
economic provider and enforcer of discipline, to emotionally engaged parent, for example 
(Ives 2015). Bearing in mind the problem of one-sidedness, Beck-Gernsheim, in her 
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exposition, challenges the misunderstanding of individualization as being synonymous with 
unconstrained freedom, howeverDQG%HFN¶VRYHU-emphasis can be held partially responsible 
(Ravn, Sørensen and Beck-Gernsheim 2013). Clearly, we are not all now free of all constraint 
and all of the trends identified by Beck remain precisely that; within the dramatic overall 
change in the expectations of contemporary fatherhood there remain many who still restrict 
their role to discipline and economic support, for example -  as there are many who have 
abandoned the role altogether. Further, the pressures of market forces, the labour market and 
education system are now brought to bear more directly, without the mediation or support of 
other institutions. In other moments, Beck also qualified the liberatory dimension, 
differentiating his conception from the general individualism of the rational actor model of 
classical economics. Yet LQ%HFN¶VWHUPVthese constraints are better thought of as a further 
stage in the individualizing process that then cast the liberated individual onto their lonely 
path. 
 
Beck does not claim originality in exploring individualization and situates his conception in 
the work of classical sociology. The difference is that in the past there were forces and 
structures that qualified and constrained individualism or, in BeFN¶VODQJXDJHDOORZHGD
SURFHVVRIµUH-embedding¶. In the work of Max Weber the continuity of traditions and 
subcultures based on status performed this function. Individualism and the weakening of 
social bonds greatly concerned the other great classical European sociologist, Emile 
Durkheim, not least its association with µDQRPLH¶DQGVXLFLGH But the power of an expanding 
market, expanding state intervention and education system, and the new moral bonds these 
could encourage potentially µUH-embedded¶LQGLYLGXDOVIUHHGIURPWKHDXWKRULW\RI tradition, 
LQ'XUNKHLP¶V perspective. Thus it is not that the process itself is new, rather it is the context 
within which it takes place. A simple example Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002, 35) use is 
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the problem of finding nursery places, an altogether different problem in the contemporary 
context of both parents working, and with often unpredictable hours compared to the fixed 
and stable careers of the past. Pressures of work may be continuous with the past but are very 
differently configured and without easily manageable boundaries, as we shift from the clearly 
GHOLQHDWHGQRUPRIµWR¶MREVWRWKHFRQWLQXDOSHUIRUPDQFHDQGUHWUDLQLQJRIPRGHUQ
flexible working. Further, in a mobile workforce grandparents are less likely than in the past 
to be conveniently located in the community and they may feel less equipped and bound by 
obligation to perform childcare.  
 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: 92) refer to how the lives of family members no longer 
µQDWXUDOO\¶ coincide in WKHµSRVW-IDPLOLDOIDPLO\¶3UHSDULQJWKHIDPily meal is no longer the 
assumed and given function it became in the earlier twentieth century, for example, delivered 
once the father returns from work at a fixed hour. Both parents are now likely to work and 
single parent households have less capacity to maintain collective meal times. Comparative 
international research indicates that single parent households and those with full time 
working mothers tend to eat together less (Davidson and Gauthier 2010). Even when 
physically together the power of individualizing dynamics is not now easily checked as 
smartphones connect each family member with their own set of priorities and social media 
worlds, emptying out physical proximity. The convenient default becomes individual eating 
and even individual foods, reflected also in how we now eat ± typically in a bowl, with a fork 
and in front of the television or laptop. Over half of meals in the United States are now eaten 
alone (NPD 2016). At the same time, family mealtimes are being maintained better in more 
secular, post-traditional societies which tend to consciously value mealtimes as a means of 




collective meal times, but dictated by the value attached to the experience and the 
organisation of routines to make it possible ± rather than the dictates of necessity. This draws 
RXWDFUXFLDODVSHFWRI%HFN¶VLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQWKHVLVWKDWLWLVQRWWKDWFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\
has been absolutely more individualized but that overcoming its pressures involves conscious 
and continual negotiation and organisation. 
 
The most common expression used by Beck to capture the process of individualization 
beyond its starting point in greater choice LVµGLVHPEHGGLQJZLWKRXWUH-HPEHGGLQJ¶The 
pressures of flexible work and a qualifications culture bear down upon the individual and 
direct them towards individual responses that problematise social relations. This is not to say 
WKDWµUH-HPEHGGLQJ¶EHFRPHVLPSRVVLEOH, EXWLWGRHVQ¶WRFFXUURXWLQHO\WKURXJKLQVWLWXWLRQV
but ad hoc, by individuals in their interactions with others. Developing this simple model 
further, Beck (1992, LGHQWLILHVDIXUWKHULQWHUPHGLDWHVWDJHRIµGLVHQFKDQWPHQW¶WKDW
IROORZVWKHµOLEHUDWLQJ¶GLPHQVLRQRIGLVHPEHGGLQJDQGSUHFHGHVWKHreintegration of 
potential re-embedding with new types of social commitment.  
 
Arguably it is this middle process that is least explored and poorly captured in the term 
µGLVHQFKDQWPHQW¶, which he better describes more fully DVµWKHORVVRIWUDGLWLRQDOVHFXULW\ZLWK
respect to practical knowledge, faLWKDQGJXLGLQJQRUPV¶. The disembedded individual must 
FRQWHQGZLWKµPDNLQJDOLIHRIRQH¶VRZQ¶LQDFRQWH[WZKHUHWKHUXOHVwhere norms and 
assumptions are no longer clear. Rather than a state of µGLVHQFKDQWPHQW¶WKLVLVPRUHXVHIXOO\ 
understood as a state of uncertainty. For example, the old constraints and stigma against 
ZRPHQ¶VIXOOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSXEOLFOLIHKDYHDOOEXWGLVDSSHDUHGEXWZRPHQQRZKDYHWR
negotiate their own way forward without clear guidelines, where we know only that the old 
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norms no longer apply. We know that modern women are free to work like men but does this 
mean they retain no special place as mothers to their children and if so, how is this to be 
demonstrated? We know that modern women do not have to passivel\DZDLWµVXLWRUV¶but 
does this mean it is acceptable, even the norm for women to take the lead in sexual relations? 
We know that modern women can drink in public without fear of stigmatization (at least in 
some countries like the UK) but does this mean it is acceptable to be drunk in public and seek 
casual sex like men? We seek answers to such questions as individuals ± in the playground, 
on social media, in cultural commentaries, and do so in a state of uncertainty that can 
determine a manufacturing of risk that can help shape this otherwise shapeless social 
environment, as I shall further elaborate in the final section below. Before we explore this 
further it is useful to affirm how the basic proposition of individualization helps make sense 
of developments at the international level, in relation to the different ideal types of 
individualization indicated by Beck. 
 
Individualization in the Contemporary New and Old Worlds of Contemporary China and 
America 
 
DHOLQHDWLQJµYDULHWLHVRILQGLYLGXDOLVP¶%HFNDQG%HFN-Gernsheim (2010: xvi) outlined 4 
ideal types. These have unfortunately received little attention, partly because of their 
appearance in the introduction to a relatively obscure volume exploring trends in the Chinese 
case that particularly interested Beck. Alongside the individualization of European 
modernity, they usefully add two further key types, with distinctively American and Chinese 
paths. The fourth is an Islamic modernity where they describe individualization as remaining 
µSURKLELWHG¶DQGLQWKHVHWHUPVLVa curious inclusion (except as a counterpoint) that will not 
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be considered here, and has not generated research attention. In reaffirming the continued 
relevance of the theory on a wider scale, recent developments in both the principal non-
European cases will be briefly reviewed. In the Chinese case, trends have accelerated even if 
they remain constrained within the shell of continued authoritarianism. In the United States - 
the classical home of modern individualization - the process has advanced to the point where 
the working class family has beFRPHG\VIXQFWLRQDOLQDFODVVLFFDVHRIµGLVHPEHGGLQJ
without re-HPEHGGLQJ¶, whilst the university-educated PLGGOHFODVVKDYHPDQDJHGWRµUH-
HPEHG¶ DµQHR-WUDGLWLRQDO¶IDPLO\.  
 
5HFHQWUHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVDQµH[SORVLRQ¶RIFRPPHQWDU\RQVH[DQGVH[XDOLW\LQChina, and 
the emergence of new individualized behaviours and mores (Jeffreys and Haiqing 2015: 1). 
Western surveys indicate a country that is now a µQDWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DVµChinese people 
LQFUHDVLQJO\GRZKDWWKH\ZDQWQRWZKDWWKH\DUHWROG¶(FRQRPLVW Chinese family 
and inter-relations are increasingly determined by ties of affection rather than duty, whilst 
still constrained by a distinctive though fading sense of filial obligation (Jankowiak and 
Moore 2016). Yan (2010:1) FKDUWVDGLVWLQFWLYHµ&KLQHVHSDWKWRLQGLYLGXDOLVP¶that became 
apparent by the 1990s, despite the continued control of the one-party state that is: 
 
«characterised by the relatively weak influence of public forces on the family, the 
greater control of the individual over her or his life, the centrality of companionate 





An accelerated cultural evolution of family life and affective ties is a striking change within 
Chinese society. Cohabitation without marriage was long anathema and officially illegal until 
2001. Today it is commonplace. Before 1980 around 1% of couples cohabited, yet at least 
40% of those marrying between 2010 and 2012 had done so (Jia, and Xie 2015). Getting 
married and having a child is no longer the clear rite of passage to adulthood it represented 
still in the 1980s. Psycho-cultural changes in affective relations have accompanied this 
change. Jankiowiak and Moore (2013) capture a changing morality of dating more amenable 
to personal development, self-expression, and an emotional connection with their romantic 
partners and spouses. Love rather than responsibility has come to the fore in the motivations 
of young people. There are changes too in core values and understandings of gender roles. 
Large scale studies of Chinese youth demonstrate that they share the Euro-American five 
core findings that all individuals, regardless of genGHUH[SHULHQFHZKHQµLQORYH¶LQFOXGLQJ
altruism, intrusive thinking and self-actualization (Jankowiak, Shen, Yao, Wang, and Volsche 
2015). Changes are not only evident in patterns of partner-seeking but in the character of 
parenting that follows. Xuan and Lamb (2015) describe the shift in the norm of Chinese 
IDWKHUKRRGIURPEHLQJµVWHUQGLVFLSOLQDULDQVWRLQYROYHGSDUHQWV¶. Another study notes a more 
general shift in gender norms. Xuan and Jankiowiak (2014) analyse WKHµGHFOLQHRIWKH
FKDXYLQLVWLFPRGHORI&KLQHVHPDVFXOLQLW\¶DQGLWVSDUWLDOUHSODFHPHQWE\newly approved 
traits of politeness, a relaxed demeanour and greater respect for women. 
 
The basis for individualizing transformation lies in economic life and the millions of rural 
Chinese working far from their families near the major cities, rarely returning and leaving 
grandparents to, hopefully, raise children. Following this extreme form of classical 
modernization of the 1970s and 1980s, since the 1990s a more flexible and targeted model is 
being encouraged that is further stimulating individualizing pressures familiar to us in the 
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West. Hundreds of millions of Chinese now work in small businesses rather than large 
institutions as the state guardedly encourages start-XSVDQGRWKHUIRUPVRIµHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS
DQGLQQRYDWLRQ¶Alongside this, there is a consumer rights consciousness, Internet 
individualism and activism, illustrating how pressures and choice now bear down upon the 
individual alongside the family and collective. 
 
Studies suggests it is the rural rather than the urban Chinese who have gone furthest and are 
least resistant to individualisation, because of their stronger motivation to disembed as a 
marginalised majority ± still unable to freely settle in cities because of residency laws, for 
example. Yan (2010: 2) also identifies a distinctively problematic dimension to Chinese 
LQGLYLGXDOLVPLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHVWDWH¶VUHMHFWLRQRIVHOI-organization and autonomy. As 
µWKHULVLQJLQGLYLGXDOLVSULPDULO\FRQILQHGWRWKHVSKHUHRISULYDWHOLIH¶, there is a tendency to 
be uncivil and concerned only with rights rather than responsibilities in interaction beyond 
the private sphere. A series of shocking incidents of civil indifference to the plight of others 
such as the 2 year old girl run over by a car and left bleeding in the street in 2011 have struck 
DSRZHUIXOFKRUGLQ&KLQHVHVRFLHW\3DUW\SXEOLFDWLRQVFRPSODLQRIDORVVRIµPRUDO
FRPSDVV¶DQd trust (Economist 2016). President Xi has incorporated a new moral publicity 
campaign in the 13th five-year plan begun in 2016 to assert supposed core socialist values 
DJDLQVW:HVWHUQµXQLYHUVDOYDOXHV¶$SDUWLFXODUIRFXVLVthe family obligation seen as so 
central to the Chinese way. A law introduced in 2013 now compels those with elderly parents 
to provide for their care, whilst the government of Shanghai took aim at the same target in 
2016, with threats to the credit ratings of those not fulfilling their filial obligations. There are 




China remains, for the majority of its population, a material rather than post-material society 
concerned with economic survival and improving life chances, instead of the self-realization 
WKURXJKFKRLFHRIOLIHVW\OHV¶FKDUDFWHULVWLFRI(XURSHDQµVHOI-SROLWLFV¶In the Chinese context, 
individual rights are not protected and inequality is not controlled by a welfare state as in 
Western Europe, and rights still WHQGWREHUHJDUGHGLQ&KLQHVHXQGHUVWDQGLQJDVµHDUQHG
SULYLOHJHVWKURXJKLQGLYLGXDOHIIRUWV¶DQGWKHLUDVVHUWLRQµSULPDULO\DFKLHYHGWKURXJKSXEOLF
DSSHDOVWRWKHVWDWH¶<DQ 13). Thus modern Chinese individualism remains constrained 
µZLWKLQWKHSarameters set by both the VWDWHDQGWKHPDUNHW¶<DQ 14). In this sense the 
Chinese case represents a hybrid that, µVLPXOWDQHRXVO\GHPRQVWUDWHVSUH-modern, modern and 
post-PRGHUQFRQGLWLRQV¶<DQ 34). For the time being there remain significant 
obstacles to the further and open development of changes along the European pattern of 
individualization. Extensive as it now is, cohabitation generally remains a prelude to marriage 
rather than an alternative to it. Whilst sex before marriage has become commonplace, births 
outside of marriage remain effectively constrained by the difficulty of the child acquiring the 
residency permit essential for access to health care, education and other public services. But 
further state attempts to stabilize and reinforce marriage and limit individualization may 
follow the European model where divorce liberalization in the late 1960s intended to achieve 
this, unintentionally established cohabitation as a norm equal to marriage rather than merely 
allow easier remarriage (Chambers 2012, 58). 
 
Developments in America, meanwhile, are very different and also problematic in the impacts 
made by contemporary individualization. The same Robert Putnam who captured the 
emergence of individualized µERZOLQJDORQH¶has now examined how µGLVHPEHGGLQJZLWKRXW
re-HPEHGGLQJ¶KDVEHJXQWRZRUNWKURXJKLQLWVLPSDFWXSRQWKHIDEULFRI$PHULFDQIDPLO\
life, drawing together the most recent and authoritative sociological family research, as well 
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as his own. He employs a framework of contrast between contemporary developments and 
WKRVHRIWKHVILWWLQJLQZLWKWKHWHPSRUDOSDWWHUQRI%HFN¶VDQDO\VLVDuring the early 
post-war years children were the µRXUNLGV¶RIWKHERRN¶VWLWOHwho lived in communities 
where working class families typically had stable work sufficient to support even the larger 
family that developed in the post war baby boom. These were communities where wealth 
gaps were less developed and obvious, and children were likely to attend the same schools 
and live within the same geographical communities. This 1950s family was made possible by 
a strongly patriarchal division of labour, coupled with widely shared prosperity that allowed 
most families to function on one income. A strong norm against extra-marital births meant 
that premarital pregnancy was followed by the family-SUHVVXUHGµshotgun¶ marriage. This 
collapsed from the 1970s in what is agreed to be the most dramatic change in the history of 
American family structure, as premarital sex lost its stigma and women entered the new era 
of unbridled choice. The feminist revolution transformed gender and marital norms, allowing 
women to enter the world of work, driven by economic necessity and new opportunities. 
Meanwhile, the end of the long post-war boom began to reduce economic security for young 
men. These changes took place within a context of an individualist swing towards self-
fulfilment. 
 
3XWQDPVKDUHV%HFN¶VHPSKDVLVXSRQan initially economically-driven disembedding, with 
the decline of traditional industrial employment as the key driver behind the disintegration of 
the American working class family; a change ultimately more important than the cultural 
revolution of the 1960s, LQ3XWQDP¶VYLHZ. Stable and relatively well-paid industrial labour 
has been replaced by a world of temporary, low paid work insufficient to sustain the nuclear 
family of the 1950s. Initially, community bonds such as the church, teachers and collective 
parental responsibility for child welfare liPLWHGWKHLPSDFWRIUHFHVVLRQDQGDFWHGDVDQµre-
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HPEHGGLQJ¶FKHFNXSRQLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ, as it had done in the past. But the force of an 
individualized economy demanding flexibility and skills has proven too powerful.  
 
Individualised pressures are brought to bear most intensively through education, and now 
demarcate different sections of American societyLQ3XWQDP¶VDQDO\VLV. Data shows the 
divide in American fortunes from the early 1980s is now between those with higher education 
and those without, with a massive rise in wages for those with, and an actual decline for those 
without. The patterns of American life are now divided into three: those who have not 
experienced at least college education, those that have, and those who have gone on to 
university. Among the least educated third, he describes µIUDJLOHIDPLOLHV¶FKDUDFWHULVHGE\
permanent but less durable cohabitation with successive partners, few resources and limited 
communication. Whilst still formally valuing marriage and more permanent union, working 
class women permanently await their partners earning sufficient to sustain a family. In the 
meantime, male partners drift off and new ones temporarily appear. Whilst the college-
educated delay childbirth by 6 years compared to the 1950s, the school educated have 
children earlier than in the 1960s, in their late teens or early 20s. An extensive body of 
UHVHDUFKGHWDLOVWKHGLVLQWHJUDWLYHLPSDFWVDPRQJWKHVHµIUDJLOHIDPLOLHV¶DQGWKHLU 
fundamental dysfunctionality (Fragile Families 2017). 
 
The American middle and upper classes, meanwhile, have pulled away dramatically in terms 
of achievement and geography, in a society now defined not by class directly, but by the 
pressures of educational attainment. Putnam notes approvingly that the upper third have been 




are outsourced and children are intensively  micro-managed by µKHOLFRSWHUSDUHQWV¶ who 
police their limited interaction with the outside world. American middle class families are 
engaged in a carefully managed project of conscious µre-embedding¶. Putnam describes 
WRGD\¶VµSXVK\PLGGOHFODVVPRP¶obsessed with school grades and extra-curricular activities, 
with children only getting 5-6 hours to sleep every night because of the burdens of homework 
in now highly selective schools. Parents substitute themselves for their children, taking over 
college applications and writing their essays, in this and other accounts (Lythcott-Haims 
2015). One mother stresses that the micro-management of contempRUDU\SDUHQWLQJµQHYHU
HQGV¶DVWKH\VWULYHWR ensure that their offspring are individually the strongest positioned in 
the intensively competitive environment of contemporary America. Above all, this means 
µLY\RIGLH¶; ensuring that children can fight for a place at elite universities. Middle class 
parents recreate wider support systems within the family, but this is a highly demanding and 
precarious project; as one describes:   
 
µP\IDPLO\LVOLNHWKHVXEPDULQHWUDYHOOLQJWKURXJKKD]DUGRXVVHDVDQGKDYLQJGHSWK
charges all around it ± suicide attempts, bulimia, anorexia, running away, all one 
GHJUHHRIVHSDUDWLRQDZD\«but my daughters managed to come through all of this 
IDPLO\WXUEXOHQFH¶ (Putnam 2015, 67) 
 
The overall WKHPHRI3XWQDP¶VSLFWXUHRIFRQWHPSRUDU\$PHULFDQOLIHLVWKHEUHDNGRZQRI
institutions and norms that, in the past, allowed re-embedding. Institutions like the local 
church and philanthropic organizations allowed for a degree of upward social mobility and a 
relatively integrated community. Behind this stood a relatively fixed world of jobs for life, 
with norms and assumptions that reinforced this conservative stability. In its absence, 
20 
 
individuals and communities have been forced into retreat, bunkered into socially-segregated 
schools and communities. Individualization is less mediated among the American poor and 
outcomes far worse. The picture that emerges of lower working class life is a harsh one 
where the family has ceased to provide meaningful support and insulation. Individualization 
means the collapse of trust in others as each looks only to themselves for survival. Those with 
more resources in the middle class are shielded from disembedding pressures and have a wide 
range of professionally-GHULYHGµZHDNWLHV¶WKH\FDQFDOOXSRQ, not least to advance the 
futures of their offspring. A re-embedding process is evident among the American middle 
class but it remains a very conscious and fraught process that also lacks a broader community 
imperative in a highly competitive environment. 
 
Japan is a distinctive example of individualization with evidence indicating an effect even on 
sexual relations themselves, and suggesting a further ideal type to those outlined by Beck 
with little sign of the re-embedding apparent among at least the American middle class. Japan 
has seen a drastic drop both in the birth rate and marriage since the 1970s, that has not been 
compensated for by the rise of cohabitation seen in the west (Miho 2000). Sex and birth 
outside marriage remains stigmatized and no provision is made to allow combining work and 
family. Whilst a majority retain the intention in the abstract to marry as they do in America, 
respondents cite reasons such as not being able to find a suitable partner ± or at least a partner 
that fits with their aspirations. Official surveys report the proportion of both men and women 
ZKRFRQVLGHUWKDWµVLQJOHOLIHKDVPHULWV¶ has remained at 80% in subsequent decades as 
marriage is reported as constraining freedom, friendships and financial independence 
(NIOPASSR 2011: 4). Over half of respondents describe themselves as single. There are 
indicators that individualization may have intensified to the point that even sexual relations 
themselves have become problematic, embodied in the popular QRWLRQRIµFHOLEDF\
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V\QGURPH¶7KHJRYHUQPHQWVLQJOHVVXUYH\LQGLFDWHVRYHUa third of all childbearing-age 
Japanese reporting never had sex. The proportion of singles without any relationship with the 
opposite sex continues to increase: 61% of unmarried men and 49% of unmarried women 
aged 18-34 were not in any kind of romantic relationship. Another widely reported survey 
indicated 45% of women aged 16-24 as not interested in, even despising all sexual contact 
and one third of respondents under the age of 30 never having dated at all (Japan Family 
Planning Association, 2015). For some, services aQGWHFKQRORJLHVVXFKDVµYLUWXDOJLUOIULHQGV¶ 
OLNH1LQWHQGR¶Vµ/RYH3OXV¶act as substitute relationships. 
 
 
A Path Back to Risk through Uncertainty  
 
Having RXWOLQHGWKHFRQWRXUVRI%HFN¶VLGHDVDQGLQGLFDWHGWKHLUFRQWLQXHGWRHPHUJLQJ
patterns globally, this review will close with a focus on the stage of µGLVHQFKDQWPHQW¶ in the 
individualization process ± better expressed as uncertainty - in which the individual is left by 
the process of disembedding. It is a neglected moment in the process that has implications for 
risk research and provides a link between individualization and risk. Beck left the different 
elements of his theory separate, but connecting the two allows insight into the dynamics 
behind risk construction, particularly in relation to interpersonal relations and between 
individuals and institutions.  
 
Risk research acknowledges the centrality of trust to risk perception and management, with 
mistrust determining heightened risk perception (Wachinger, Renn, Begg and Kuhlicke 
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2013). A heightened propensity for risk perception is also intrinsic to the more individualized 
world we have described; consider the description above of even American middle class 
IDPLO\OLIHDVRQHRIDµVXEPDULQHWUDYHOOLQJWKURXJKKD]DUGRXVVHDV¶As we saw in the case 
of China, there is a corrosion of citizenship as the public sphere is colonized by the private 
and its concerns. Shared experience is then likely to be against perceived risks to the 
individual and their security; as Bauman (2002, [L[SXWLWDµPRPHQWDU\JDWKHULQJDURXQGD
QDLORQZKLFKPDQ\VROLWDU\LQGLYLGXDOVKDQJWKHLUVROLWDU\LQGLYLGXDOIHDUV¶ 
 
Risk is a calculation about the future expressed in probabilistic terms. Uncertainty prevails 
instead where such calculations cannot be made and is altogether more difficult, not least for 
the individual who is left without bearings or direction. 7KHQRWLRQRIWKHµULVNPDQDJHPHQW
RIHYHU\WKLQJ¶LVXVHIXOKHUHZKHUHE\SURIHVVLRQDOVH[SRVHGWRFKDOOHQJHVWRWKHLUindividual 
performance fall back upon considering their own fate and reputations through secondary risk 
management, in a culture of risk avoidance and defensive institutions (Power 2004). A 
response to threats to health and security under conditions of uncertainty is to manufacture 
µrisk ULWXDOV¶. Uncertainty thereby becomes manageable, even as risk becomes a fixed source 
of anxiety requiring permanent management (Burgess and Moore 2011).  
 
5HWXUQLQJWR%HFN¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQWLQJUHDWHUIUHHGRPDQGFKRLFHWhe roles that acted as a 
EDUULHUWRZRPHQ¶VOLEHUDWLRQLQWKHSDVWDQGKDYHQRZ dissolved were also roles that 
µconnected individuals to the larger social structure of classes DQGV\VWHPV¶Beck and 
Williams 2004, 66). ,QVWHDGRIUROHVHWVZHKDYHµLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIindividual options, 
WKHQHFHVVLW\RIFKRLFHEHWZHHQWKHPDQGWKHLQGHWHUPLQDWHQHVVRIWKHILQDORXWFRPH«QR
guarantees that any given set of cKRLFHVDFWXDOO\LVFRPSDWLEOH¶. This is the characteristic state 
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of individualized and anxious uncertainty that is the condition of the second modernity. This 
is what he sometimes termed µWUDJLFLQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ¶, where the individual is left 
unenviable choice. One response is to pass choice and the responsibility that comes with it to 
others. In the sphere of new technology, scientific and political institutions lack the authority 
they once had in conditions of uncertainty and tend towards backing away from clear 
judgement, passes it in turn to the individual. Beck (2006: 336) uses the example of GMOs 
ZKHUHWKHµ«UHsponsibility for the decision on genetically modified foods and their 
unforeseeable, unknowable long-term consequences is ultimately dumped on the so-called 
µUHVSRQVLEOHFRQVXPHU¶7KHGHFLVLRQWRDYRLG*02Vwas a relatively easy one but others are 
not. UK authorities entertained health dangers from mobile phones but would not take action, 
for example, instead leaving parents with the advice ± but impossible task - of limiting their 
FKLOGUHQ¶VH[SRVXUH (Burgess 2004). This took place in circumstances where competing risk 
messages compelled parents to equip even young children with a phone to monitor their 
whereabouts. 
 
Choice and freedom has brought, in its wake, uncertainty ± often painfully experienced in the 
case of contemporary sexual relations. Bell (2013: 79) reveals a picture of contemporary 
twenty-something young women who are achieving more and who encounter few barriers or 
VWLJPDLQWKHLUZD\EXWDUHDOVRPRUHµFRQIXVHGFRQIOLFWHGDQGXQFHUWDLQDERXWZKDWWKH\
ZDQWFRPSDUHGWRHOGHUV¶2WKHUstudies affirm the sense of a confused and anxious 
generation, characteristically identifying a combination of material and socio-psychological 
issues, where economic insecurity and lack of independence is bound up with low self-esteem 




Bulcroft, Bulcroft, Bradley and Simpson (2000: 66) describe the production of risk 
perception from the uncertainty of contemporary intimate relationships; a paradox that whilst 
contemporary intimate relationships become free in the context of a µQHDUO\FRPSOHWH
EUHDNGRZQRIVRFLDOO\UHJXODWHGPDWHVHOHFWLRQ¶, they are also increasingly formalised and 
managed. Commitment of the self and establishing obligation to another becomes a risk to 
the autonomous individual, to be managed by µH[SHUW¶LQWHUPHGLDULHV. Mechanisms to identify 
suitable partners have increased exponentially across the world, from dating agencies 
employing probabilistic-based unions in the industrialized world, to ,QGLDQµORYHPDWFKLQJ¶
advertisements that specify suitable caste and professional status alongside personally 
attractive qualities. 7KHµSHUIHFWO\SODQQHG¶ZHGGLQJPDy lie at the end of both. Pressure to 
produce the perfect match between individuals is intense and the potential relationship itself 
becomes a risk that threatens the autonomy of the individual.  
 
Another response to uncertainty beyond displacing responsibility is a backing away; a 
postponement of intimate engagement, made possible by the prevalence of lifestyle choice. In 
this context, we can understand an important dynamic behind the rise of the young lifestyle 
singleton now so prevalent in the urban West, who have rejected not only marriage but 
permanent relationships, or at least indefinitely postponed the difficulty. In 1950 only 22% of 
American adults were single, living alone being most common in the sprawling Western 
states, whereas today over 50% are single, a majority women, and largely metropolitan 
(Klinenberg 2012: 5). Such a pattern is evident in the UK and even more pronounced in 




What follows from this construction of risk from uncertainty is the development of individual 
strategies of risk management. In her interviews with young women, Lewis (2006: 48) 
identifies a precautionary impulse whereby women who, for example, moved in with their 
SDUWQHUVVRXJKWDµJHWRXWFODXVH¶LIWKLQJVµZHQWZURQJ¶2QHZRPDQGHVFULEHGRQO\
proceeding as she had the security of already co-owning another property and could always 
fall back upon sleeping there if the relationship did not meet expectations. The desire to have, 
and share, a child introduces further possible risk, in these accounts, with anxiety about 
whether their chosen partner will share their desires and vision, and how certain those 
IHHOLQJVDUH7KHµOLIHRIRQH¶VRZQ¶ZLWKRWKHUVLVDGHOLFDWHHTXLOLEULXPWRVXVWDLQDQG
respondents µ«talked about the arrival of children as having the most potential to upset the 
sometimes fragile balance that had EHHQDFKLHYHG¶(Lewis 2006: 50). 
 
Contemporary parental uncertainties similarly determine risk construction, given the intensity 
of pressure to perfect a practice RIµSDUHQWLQJ¶ with few guidelines but an injunction to 
protect, nurture and prepare offspring for an intensely competitive world. We now know that 
old styles of parenting are unacceptable but in the absence of any certainty about how it 
might be performed otherwise, there is a natural trajectory to retreat to a default of 
prioritising safety and security. A continually negotiated routine of micro-management and 
insulation of children from risk has been embedded in modern parenting routines and 
assumptions (Scott, Jackson and Milburn 1998). Most dramatically, the threat of the 
predatory, murderous paedophile performs the role of a risk to be policed, giving clarity to 





pressures are now more intense than ever before, rooted in greater socio-economic insecurity 
but with implications for a wide range of social experience and interaction, from the 
establishment of human relationships to the eating of meals and parenting that may or may 
not follow. There are fewer countervailing pressures and institutions checking a trajectory 
that is apparent around the developed and developing world, albeit in different forms. The 
review has gone a step further, drawing out a more explicit link between individualization 
creating uncertainty, out of which we are more prone to manufacture risk. 
 
We now confront uncertainty more alone than in the past, deprived of a ready-made set of 
assumptions and norms through which they can be managed. Under such circumstances there 
is likely to be a retreat into what is perceived to be a position of safety. The language of 
safety, security and risk (avoidance) figures prRPLQHQWO\DVDUHFRXUVHRIWKHµGLVHPEHGGHG¶
individual deprived of other clear guidance. If we can do nothing else, we can at least strive 
to make our communities/families/children/bodies µsafe¶DQGHQWHULQWRDSHUPDQHQWFRQGLWLRQ
RIWKHµULVNPDQDJHPHQW RIHYHU\WKLQJ¶ Understanding this dynamic is useful in making 
sense of risk behaviours and controversies, looking far beyond the characteristics of the 
hazard itself and how it is communicated. 
 
This is by no means to suggest the manufacturing of risk from individualized uncertainty is 
WKHRQO\G\QDPLFRUWKDWLWLVDSHUPDQHQWFRQGLWLRQZLWKRXWVROXWLRQ7KLVµWUDJLF
LQGLYLGXDOL]DWLRQ¶RIULVNLVRIWHQPRPHQWDU\VKDUHGPRPHQWVRIDQ[LHW\DJDLQVW a 
constructed target that can quickly pass. We FDQDQGVRDOVRVWULYHIRUQHZµFRQVWLWXWLYH
QRUPV¶ DFFRUGLQJWR%HFNDQGORRNIRUQHZZD\VWRµkeep individualization from careering 
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LQWRDWRPL]DWLRQ¶%HFNDQG:LOOLDPV. The American middle class has found one 
ZD\WKURXJKUHFRQVWLWXWLQJDµQHo-WUDGLWLRQDO¶DUUDQJHPHQWHYHQWKRXJKLWUHPDLQVIUDXJKW. 
7KHUHLVVXFFHVVIXOµUH-HPEHGGLQJ¶LQRWKHUDUHDVVXFKDV6XFFHVVLQVRPHDUHDVVXFKDV
regular family mealtimes in the face of individualizing pressures pulling everyone apart. We 
can strive IRURWKHUPHDQVRIµUH-HPEHGGLQJ¶ but it needs to be done consciously and 
continually in the project RIµPDNLQJDOLIHRIRQH¶VRZQ¶WKDWLVWKHHVVHQFHRI%HFN¶V
individualization. 
 
Acknowledgements: this paper waVILUVWSUHVHQWHGDWWKHDSSUHFLDWLRQRI%HFN¶VZRUNDWWKH
University of Princeton in May 2015 and I thank Rosemary Taylor of Tufts University for 
organising the event. 
  
Bibliography 
Atkinson, Will. 2007. µBeck, individualization and the death of class: a critique¶British 
Journal of Sociology, 58(3), 349-66. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. The Individualized Society. Oxford: Polity. 
---------------------- 2002. Foreword, in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization, xiv-xix. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications.  
----------------- µ/LYLQJLQDZRUOGULVNVRFLHW\¶Economy and Society , 35 , 329±45 . 
336 
Beck, U. and Williams, J. 2004. Conversation 2: Individualization, in, Conversations with 
Ulrich Beck. Oxford Polity. 
28 
 
Beck, Ulrich and Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. 2002. Individualization: Institutionalized 
Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences, London: Sage Publications 
------------------------------------------------------- 2010. Foreword: Varieties of Individualization, 
in Hansen, Mette and Svarverud, Rune, IChina: The Rise of the Individual in Modern 
Chinese Society, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 
Bell, Leslie. 2013. Hard to Get: 20 something women and the paradox of sexual freedom. 
University of California press.  
Berger, Peter and Hitzler,  Ronald (ed.) 2010. Individualisierungen: Ein Vierteljahrhundert 
µ-HQVHLWVYRQ6WDQGXQG.ODVVH¶Wiesbaden, Germany: VS-Verlag.  
Borscheid, Peter and Haueter, Niels Viggo. 2012. World Insurance: the evolution of a global 
risk network. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bulcroft. R, Bulcroft. K, Bradley. K, Simpson. C., 2000. 'The management and production 
of risk in romantic relationships: a Postmodern paradox.' Journal of Family History, 25(1): 
63-92. 
Burgess, Adam. 2004. Cellular Phones, Public Fears and a Culture of Precaution. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
------------------  2006. The Making of the Risk-Centred Society and the Limits of Social Risk 
Research, Health, Risk and Society 8(4): 329-342.  
 
Burgess, Adam. and Moore, Sarahµ5LVN5LWXDOV¶Journal of Risk Research, 14 (1-2): 
111-124. 
 
Burzan, Nicole. 2011. Soziale Ungleichheit. Eine Einführung in die zentralen Theorien.   
Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS. 
Chambers, Deborah. 2012. A Sociology of Family Life. Oxford: Polity. 
29 
 
de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1998 (orig. ed. 1835) Democracy in America. Wordsworth. 
'DYLGVRQ5HEHFFDDQG*DXWKLHU$QQHµA cross-national multi-level study of family 
PHDOV¶International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 51(5): 349-365. 
Dawson, Matt. 2012. Reviewing the critique of individualization: The disembedded and 
embedded theses, Acta Sociologica 55(4): 305±319. 
Economist 2016. Special Report: Chinese Society, Family, Identity and Morality, (July 9) 
available at:  http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21701650-chinese-people-
increasingly-do-what-they-want-not-what-they-are-told-nation?frsc=dg%7Cd 
Fragile Families. 2017. Research publications of CRCW Fragile Families Project. Princeton 
University Fragile Families project, available at: 
http://crcw.princeton.edu/publications/publications.asp 
Giddens, Antony. 1991.  Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern 
Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
--------------------- 1992. The Transformation of Intimacy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Howard, Cosmo (ed). 2007. Contested Individualization: Debates about Contemporary 
Personhood. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ives, Jon. 2015. µ7KHRULVLQJ the µGHOLEHUDWLYH IDWKHU¶ compromise, progress and striving to do 
fatherhood ZHOO¶ Families, Relationships and Societies 4(2), 281-294. 
Iwasawa, Miho. 2000. The Transformation of Partnerships of Japanese Women in the 1990s, 




Jamieson, Lynn. 1998. Intimacy: Personal Relationships in Modern Societies. Oxford: Polity 
Press. 
Jankowiak, William,  Shen, Yifei,  Yao, Shiyu, Wang, Cancan and Volsche, Shelly 2015. 
,QYHVWLJDWLQJ/RYH¶V8QLYHUVDO$WWULEXWHV$5HVHDUFK5HSRUW)URP&KLQDCross-Cultural 
Research 49(4): 1±15. 
Jankowiak, William. ZLWK5REHUW0RRUH³&KDQJLQJ0RUDOLW\RI'DWLQJDQG:KDW,W
6D\V$ERXW<RXWK&KLQDDQG0RGHUQLW\³,Q$GROHVFHQWLGHQWLW\5LVNDQG&KDQJH
Evolutionary, Developmental and Cultural Perspectives. Bonnie Hewlett, ed. New York: 
Taylor and Francis/Routledge Publishers. 
Jankowiak, William and Moore, Robert. 2016. Family Life in China. Oxford: Polity. 
Jankowiak, William and Moore, Robert. &KLQD¶V(PHUJHQW<RXWK*HQGHU:RUN
Dating, and Life Orientation in Adolescent Identity Evolutionary, Cultural and 
Developmental Perspectives. Bonnie L. Hewlett (ed.). New York: Routledge: 277  
Jankowiak, William (with Xuan Li). 2016.Chinese Fathers: Masculinity Redefined. In, 
Changing Chinese Masculinities: From Imperial Pillars of State to Global Real Men, Kam 
Louie (ed.). Hong Kong University Press. 
Jeffreys, Elaine and Yu, Haiqing. 2015. Sex in China. Oxford: Polity. 
Klinenberg, Eric. 2012.  Going Solo. New York: Penguin. 
Lash, Scott. 2002. Foreword, in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization, vii-xvi. 
Lewis, Jane. 2006. µ3HUFHSWLRQVRI risk in intimate relationships: the implications for social 
SURYLVLRQ¶ Journal of Social Policy 35(1): 39-57. 
Lythcott-Haims, Julie. 2015. How to Raise an Adult. New York: Bluebird. 
31 
 
Li Xuan and Michael E. Lamb. 2015. Fathers in Chinese Culture From Stern Disciplinarians 
to Involved Parents J. Roopnarine. (Ed.) Fathers across cultures: The importance, roles, and 
diverse practices of dads. New York: Praeger 
Li Xuan and Jankiowiak, William (2014) Decline of the Chauvinistic Model of Chinese 
Masculinity, Chinese Sociological Review 46(4): 3±18. 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIOPASSR). 2011. Attitudes 
toward Marriage and the Family among Japanese Singles: Overview of the Results of the 
Fourteenth Japanese National Fertility Survey in 2010. Retrieved November 16, from 
http://www.ipss.go.jp/ps-doukou/e/doukou14_s/Nfs14_Singles_Eng.pdf 
Nolan, James. 1998. The Therapeutic State. New York: New York University Press. 
NPD. 2006. Consumers are alone over half of eating occasions as a result of changing 
lifestyles and more single person households, New York: NPD Group. 
ONS (Office of National Statistics) 2015. Families and Households. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/fa
mily-demography/families-and-households/2015/stb-families-and-households.html 
Power, Mike. 2004. The Nature of Risk: The Risk Management of Everything, Balance Sheet 
12(5): 19-28. 
Putnam, Robert. 2001. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
New York: Simon and Schuster. 
---------------------- 2015. Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Ravn, Tine, Sørensen, Mads, and Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. 2013. Interview with Elisabeth 





Scott, Sue, Stevi Jackson and Kathryn Milburn. 1998. µ6ZLQJVDQG5RXQGDERXWV5LVN
$Q[LHW\DQGWKH(YHU\GD\:RUOGVRI&KLOGUHQ¶Sociology 32(4): 689-705. 
Turkle, Sherry. 2011. Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from 
Each Other. New York: Basic Books. 
Wachinger, Gisela, Renn, Ortwin, Begg, Chloe and Kuhlicke, Christian. 2013. The Risk 
Perception Paradox²Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards, 
Risk Analysis 33(6): 1049±1065. 
<RXQJ:RPHQ¶V7UXVW(accessed 15 November 2016) Accessed October 24th: 
http://www.youngwomenstrust.org/nocountryforyoungwomen 
Yan, Yunxiang. 2010. Introduction: Conflicting images of the Individual and Contested 
Process of Individualization. In Hansen, Mette and Svarverud, Rune, IChina: The Rise of the 
Individual in Modern Chinese Society, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 1-38. 
Yu, Jia, and Yu Xie³Cohabitation in China: Trends and Determinants´ Population 
and Development Review 41(4): 607-628. 
 
 
 
 
 
